Ukraine's third wave of military reform 2016–2022 – building a military able to defend Ukraine against the Russian invasion.

This article explores an important and often overlooked element of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against the Russian invasion in February 2022 – the adoption of a modified western transformational model of military reform – which has focused on mass and building a western style NATO interoperable and trained military. This article argues that Ukraine's military reform since 2016, in particular the focus on Command and Control, the development of an NCO Corps and Special Forces as well as clear procurement priorities have created the enabling conditions for the development of a flexible and adaptable military force, able to limit Russia's battlefield success and bring the fight to the enemy. Despite this progress, however, a recurring problem facing the Ukrainian military, that is likely to continue in the future, is how to balance the ongoing requirement for mass against the urgent need for military modernisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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