DUAL-USE MATERIAL SCIENCE TECHNOLOGIES TRANSFER IN UKRAINE: PREMISES AND PRESENT CATCH-22

The object of effortis to assess the underpin premises of transfer of dual use materials science technologies appeared in Ukraine after the Independence and those developed until nowadays. It is also to shed a light on this issue and evaluate historical, technical, political, and mental barriers between technology supplier / recipient and future prospects and successful steps to be made to overcome those. The workputs a problemto scrutinize today’s and future materials science dual use technology transfer control regulations and all premises associated and leaving an imprint on the realities existing in Ukraine. First of all, it is important to study technology transfer issues and a vital role of those premises appeared in Ukraine otherwise one may chase a ghost while trying to understand how to put it correct in a right legal and political way to successfully resolve this matter since in this case none turnkey solutions ever exist. For example, central to a control regime debate is to discuss an evolution, or lack of the existing transparent legislation covering dual-use technologies, and a discussion on its orientation and scope. Does this really work and sound in practice, and if “yes” then to what extent? Second, at a time of fundamental change in nature and order of international relations, the wisdom of ad hoc control regimes must not escape scrutiny. Although experts are very much aware of these problems, future of control regulations remains still blurred and uncertain, so what are their potential implications for international state’s security? The research revealedthat a reassessment of the problems surrounding dual use materials science technologies and today’s control regulations should be made – both in terms of their potential improvement and/or possible new universal multilateral agreements and transparency among states involved in technology transfer. This further argues a need for new international mechanisms to ensure the transfer of dual-use materials science technologies, while not powering proliferation opportunities for weapon systems. The results of this endeavormake a ground floor for further debates in terms of politics and export control in the field of transfer of intangible technologies.